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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY OBTAINED IN
VIOLATION OF Miranda FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES, EVEN
THOUGH NOT BARRED BY THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, INFRINGES
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION'S RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINA-
TION. People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127
Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
After a four month marital separation, Robert Disbrow confronted
his wife at the home of Kathleen Pains. During the argument that
developed when he tried to remove his wife from the house, Disbrow
shot and killed her and Pairis. Five days later, Disbrow was arrested
and given the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona.' Even though
he initially said that he wished to say nothing until consulting his
attorney, Disbrow later made inculpatory statements after being told
they could not be used against him. When Disbrow testified at trial that
the two women were shot in self-defense, his admissions were used to
impeach his testimony and he was convicted. On appeal, he argued
that the admission of these statements was reversible error because they
were involuntary under the Miranda requirement that all questioning
cease after a suspect indicates his desire to remain silent.' In People v.
Disbrow,3 the Supreme Court of California agreed with Disbrow's argu-
ment and reversed his conviction. In doing so it became one of the few
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If
the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during ques-
tioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this
point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege;
any statement taken after the person invokes the privilege cannot be other than
the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off
questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual
to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been
once invoked.
Id. at 473-74 (footnote omitted).
$, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
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courts4 to reject the rationale of Harris v. New York,5 which many
commentators" felt undermined the requirements of Miranda.
In Harris, the defendant, charged with two sales of narcotics, took
the stand to deny the sale of one bag of heroin and to explain that a
second bag contained only baking powder. Over objection, the state
was permitted to impeach Harris with inculpatory statements he had
made without the benefit of Miranda warnings.7 The United States
Supreme Court affirmed Harris's conviction, relying primarily on Wald-
er v. United States." In that case the Court held that evidence obtained
through an illegal search and seizure was admissible to impeach Wald-
er's testimony on direct examination concerning matters collateral to the
crimes with which he was charged. Harris was impeached by state-
ments "bearing more directly on the crimes charged" than those im-
peaching Walder, and exclusion from the state's case in chief was based
on a violation of the fifth amendment, rather than the fourth amend-
ment. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no
"difference in principle" between Walder and Harris.' Reasoning that
4. United States v. Jordan, 44 C.M.R. 44 (1971); State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii
254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 341 A.2d 62 (Pa. 1975). Cf.
State v. Hass, 267 Ore. 489, 517 P.2d 671 (1973), reversed sub nom. Oregon v. Hass,
420 U.S. 714 (1975) (Oregon Supreme Court's reliance on independent state grounds
unclear); Butler v. State, 493 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (statutory bar of
use of statements obtained in violation of Miranda for impeachment purposes valid).
5. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
6. See, e.g., Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations
on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Dershowitz & Ely]; Comment, The Impeachment Exception to the
Constitutional Exclusionary Rules, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1476 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Impeachment Exception]; The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HI-Iv. L. REv. 38, 44-
53 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Supreme Court]; 24 VAND. L. REv. 843 (1971).
7. In Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), the Supreme Court held that
Miranda requirements were applicable in cases like Harris's, in which the offending
interrogation occurred before Miranda and the related trial followed the decision. 6u-
preme Court, supra note 6, at 44 n.4.
8. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
9. 401 U.S. at 225. In so holding, the Court ignored Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20 (1925) (evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment and directly
related to the alleged crime held inadmissible to impeach statements elicited from the
defendant on cross-examination).
Even assuming the Walder exception to Agnello was justified, extension of the ex-
ception to include fifth amendment violations was tenuous. First, an argument could
be made that demonstrative evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment is
inherently more trustworthy than an admission obtained in violation of Miranda, and
thus more readily justifies subordinating constitutional interests to those of truth determi-
nation. See Impeachment Exception, supra note 6, at 1482 n.48. Second, unlike the
fourth amendment, the fifth amendment apparently requires that testimony obtained as
a result of its violation be excluded at trial. Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 476-77 (1966) with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961) (Black, J., concur-
ring). See also Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 6, at 1214-15.
2
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"[t]he shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to
use perjury by way of a defense, free from risk of confrontation with
prior inconsistent utterances,"'" the Court upheld Harris's impeachment.
The only limitation placed on the use of such statements was that the
"trustworthiness of the evidence satisfy legal standards.""'
The California Supreme Court adopted the Harris rationale in
interpreting the California Constitution's right against self-incrimina-
tion"2 in People v. Nudd.13  Consistent with the suggestions of several
United States Supreme Court Justices,' 4 the dissenting opinion, how-
ever, argued that the question presented should be evaluated apart from
Harris on independent state grounds, allowing the state of California to
require a stricter rule than the Supreme Court.' 5 Agreeing that preven-
tion of perjury was desirable, but fearful that criminal defendants would
be deterred from taking the stand, the dissent argued that the introduc-
tion of statements procurred in violation of Miranda should not be
allowed for any purpose.
Less than two years later, the dissent's reasoning in Nudd was
adopted by a majority of the California Supreme Court in Disbrow,
giving California defendants greater protection than required by the
United States Supreme Court. While the Nudd court accepted Harris at
face value, the Disbrow court critically approached the issue using a
two-step analysis, first examining the authority relied on in Harris and,
secondly, determining the desirability of a Harris result. Carefully
reading Harris and Walder, the court rejected the "no difference in
principle" view under which the United States Supreme Court had
equated the use of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amend-
ment to impeach a defendant's testimony relating to collateral matters to
evidence obtained in violation of the fifth amendment relating directly to
the crime charged.
10. 401 U.S. at 226.
11. Id. at 224.
12. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 15.
13. 12 Cal. 3d 204, 524 P.2d 844, 115 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1974).
14. See, e.g., Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120-21 (1975) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting).
15. 12 Cal. 3d at 20, 524 P.2d at 848, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 376 ("mhe California
exclusionary rule was and is of wholly independent status, not subject to the shifting
sands of federal court interpretations . . ").
The Supreme Court "from the time of its foundation has adhered to the principle
that it will not review judgments of state courts that rest on adequate and independent
state grounds. . . . [Its] only power over state judgments is to correct them to the
extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights." Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117,
125-26 (1945). See generally Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); C.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 542-48 (3rd ed. 1976).
[Vol. 12:412
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The court also found that both the language and spirit of Miranda
were at odds with the Harris rule. Even though dismissed as dictum in
Harris, Miranda specifically contemplated and rejected the idea that
illegally obtained statements could not be used for impeachment purpos-
es.' Moreover, the court felt that Miranda's "principal objective," the
establishment of "safeguards that would liberate courts insofar as possi-
ble from the difficult and troublesome necessity of adjudicating in each
case whether coercive influences, psychological or physical, had been
employed to secure admissions or confessions"' 7 was frustrated by Har-
ris. By allowing the admission of confessions as long as they were not
involuntary, Harris returned courts to an administratively unworkable
standard, under which the totality of the circumstances in each case had
to be evaluated.' 8
Having determined that Harris was unsupported by the authority
relied on by the Supreme Court, the Disbrow majority gave three
reasons why the decision was salutory, all of which were contested by
the dissent. First, the majority argued that juries, even given a limiting
instruction, would use the inculpatory statements as substantive evidence
of guilt rather than merely as evidence of the defendant's credibility:
To instruct a jury that they are not to consider expressions
of complicity in the charged crime as evidence that the speaker
in fact committed the charged crime, but only for the purpose
of demonstrating that he was probably lying when he denied
committing the charged crime, would be to require, in the
words of Learned Hand, "a mental gymnastic which is beyond,
not only [the jury's] power, but anybody's else." 9
The dissent was unpersuaded by this reasoning and argued that the fear
was speculative because no empirical evidence existed on the question.
16. The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being
compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it does not distinguish degrees
of incrimination... . [N]o distinction may be drawn between inculpatory
statements and statements alleged to be merely "exculpatory.". . . [S]tate-
ments merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to
impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement
given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication. These state-
ments are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be
used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any other
statement.
384 U.S. at 476-77 (emphasis added).
17. 16 Cal. 3d at 111, 545 P.2d at 278, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 366, quoting People
v. Fioritto, 68 Cal. 2d 714, 717, 441 P.2d 625, 626, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817, 818 (1968).
18. Supreme Court, supra note 6, at 52-53.
19. 16 Cal. 3d at 112, 545 P.2d at 279, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 367, quoting Nash v.
United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932) (brackets in original).
1976]
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The majority's next argument was that admissibility of statements
such as those involved in Disbrow left police with little incentive to
comply with Miranda's requirements. Implicit in the court's reasoning
was the assumption that Harris forces a defendant to make an unreason-
able choice. If he chooses not to testify in his own behalf, a strategy
likely to be more effective than any other, the state is given a real
advantage. On the other hand, if the defendant does testify, his coerced
confession will be heard by the jury. 0 The dissent responded that
Miranda requirements would still be met because the state's primary
motive was to gather evidence for use in its case in chief, which was still
barred if Miranda were violated.
The last reason advanced was that by allowing such statements to
be introduced, courts participated in illegal conduct: "Out of regard
for its own dignity as an agency of justice and a custodian of liberty
[courts] should not have a hand in such 'dirty business.' "21 The
dissent's reply was that by adopting a rule under which perjured testimo-
ny would not be exposed, courts engage in a dirtier business.
While most state courts have accepted the Harris rule,22 only a
fraction of those considering the issue have clearly rejected the argument
that the relevant state constitution requires more stringent enforcement
of Miranda than does the federal constitution.23 In the majority of the
cases accepting the Harris rationale, the case was uncritically accepted as
controlling.2 4  The reasoning of the Disbrow dissent was representative
of courts that did consider the possibility of rejecting the Harris rationale
on an independent state ground. Like the Disbrow dissent, those courts
apparently followed Harris because they accepted the United States
20. 16 Cal. 3d at 113, 545 P.2d at 279, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 367. See Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Riddell v. Rhay, 404 U.S.
974 (1971) (Douglas, I., dissenting from denial of writ of certiorari); Commonwealth
v. Woods, 455 Pa. 1, 7, 312 A.2d 357, 360 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (Roberts, J., concurring)
(defendant's decision in Harris situation described as a "grisly Hobson's choice"); Der-
showitz & Ely, supra note 6, at 1220-21. Cf. State v. Kish, 28 Utah 2d 430, 503 P.2d
1208 (1972) (defendant's challenge of Harris impeachment rejected because he was
warned prior to trial that his statements given without Miranda warnings could be used
to impeach his testimony).
21. 16 Cal. 3d at 113, 545 P.2d at 279, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
22. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 109 Ariz. 70, 505 P.2d 241 (1973); Jorgenson v.
People, 174 Colo. 144, 482 P.2d 962 (1971), overruling Velarde v. People, 171 Colo.
261, 466 P.2d 919 (1970).
23. E.g., State v. Retherford, 270 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1972); Commonwealth v. Harris,
364 Mass. 236, 303 N.E.2d 115 (1973); State v. Miller, 67 N.J. 229, 337 A.2d 36
(1975).
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Supreme Court's assertion that exclusion of prior testimony in a Harris
situation is appropriate because "sufficient deterrence flows when the
evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in
chief." 5  As a result, these courts found that adequate protection was
provided by limiting instructions and the trial judge's authority under
the rules of evidence to exclude testimony where its probative value is
outweighed by the risk that it might mislead or unduly prejudice the
jury.26 Unlike the suggestion of the Disbrow dissent, no court has been
persuaded by the argument that state courts should defer to the Supreme
Court's interpretation of similar constitutional language because it "pro-
motes uniformity and harmony in an area of the law which particularly
and uniquely requires them."27
Disbrow, then, even though one of the few cases to reject the Harris
rationale, also appears to be one of the few to consider independent state
constitutional grounds. While in the minority, its retreat from Nudd
and its critical examination of the Harris rationale may reflect a trend
toward wider reappraisal of the implications of Harris.28 If such reap-
praisal is occurring, Disbrow's use of the California Constitution29
illustrates a means by which most state courts that have considered the
problem, as well as those that have yet to face it, can safeguard the
rights guaranteed criminal defendants by Miranda."
Ronald Alan Glaser
25. 401 U.S. at 325. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Harris, 364 Mass. 236, -, 303
N.E.2d 115, 117 (1973).
26. E.g., State v. Miller, 67 N.J. 229, 337 A.2d 36, 39 (1975).
The results reached in these cases are tellingly susceptible to the criticism voiced
in Disbrow that limiting instructions are ineffective to prevent misuse of the evidence
offered for impeachment. See, e.g., Criss v. State, 507 P.2d 935, 937 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1973) ("[Tihe statement was admitted for the purpose of impeaching defendant's
denial that he had admitted committing the robbery involved.")
27. 16 Cal. 3d at 119, 545 P.2d at 284, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 372 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting). But see Butler v. State, 493 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (Roberts,
J., dissenting).
28. See People v. Sturgis, 58 Ill. 2d 211, 317 N.E.2d 545 (1974) (Goldenlush, J.,
dissenting); Johnson v. State, 258 Ind. 683, 284 N.E.2d 515 (1972) (DeBruler & Pren-
tice, JJ., dissenting separately); Commonwealth v. Mahnke, - Mass. -, 335 N.E.2d
660, 690 (1975) (Kaplan & Hennessey, JJ., dissenting separately); State v. Miller, 67
N.J. 229, 337 A.2d 36 (1975) (Pashman & Clifford, JI., dissenting separately).
29. A stricter rule could also be justified under state constitutional provisions guar-
anteeing due process. See State v. Miller, 67 N.J. 229, -, 337 A.2d 36, 43-44 (1975)
(Pashman, J., dissenting).
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HUSBAND AND WIFE-MARRIAGE oF MALE AND SURGICALLY
REASSIGNED TRANSSEXUAL HELD VALID. M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J.
Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204, certification denied 71 N.J. 345, 364
A.2d 1076 (1976).
M.T. v. J.T." involved the ceremonial marriage of a postoperative
male-to-female transsexual2 to a male, desertion by the husband, and an
ensuing suit for support by the wife. Defendant husband had known
and lived with the plaintiff before her sex reassignment surgery, had
consummated the marriage, and provided support for over two years
before abandoning the home.3
The New Jersey Superior Court accepted the universal premise that
a lawful marriage involved a union between persons of the opposite sex. 4
Thus, the issue before the court was "whether the marriage between a
male and a post-operative transsexual, who has surgically changed her
external sexual anatomy from male to female, is to be regarded as a
lawful marriage between a man and a woman."5  In upholding the
validity of the marriage and granting the support requested, the court
determined that human sexuality embraced gender as well as
anatomy: 6 "[F]or marital purposes if the anatomical or genital fea-
tures of a genuine transsexual are made to conform to the person's
gender, psyche or psychological sex, then identity by sex must be
governed by the congruence of these standards." 7
1. 140 N.J. Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204, certification denied, 71 N.J. 345, 364 A.2d
1076 (1976).
2. Plaintiff's expert medical doctor, a specialist in gender identity, defined a trans-
sexual as:
[A] person who discovers sometime, usually very early in life, that there is
a great discrepancy between the physical genital anatomy and the person's
sense of self-identity as a male or as a female. . . . mhe transsexual is one
who has a conflict between physical anatomy and psychological identity or
psychological sex.
Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 205. A similar definition was given at the trial by a psychologist,
who characterized a transsexual as "someone whose physical anatomy does not corre-
spond to their [sic] sense of being, to their [sic] sense of gender." Id. at -, 355 A.2d
at 206. See also Holloway, Transsexuals-Their Legal Sex, 40 U. COLO. L. REV. 282,
282-83 (1968).
3. 140 N.J. Super. at -, 355 A.2d at 205.
4. Id. at -- 355 A.2d at 207-08. See note 10 infra and accompanying text.
5. Id. at -, 35.5 A.2d at 208.
6. See id. at -, 355 A.2d at 209. Gender was defined as "one's self-image, the
deep psychological or emotional sense of sexual identity and character." Id.
7. Id. The court distinguished two New York cases, B. v. B., 78 Misc. 2d 112,
355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1974) and Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982,
7
Hayes: Criminal Procedure--Admission of Testimony Obtained in Violation
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013
1976] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In Loving v. Virginia,8 the United States Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that "[tihe freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of
the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men . . . Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,'
fundamental to our very existence and survival." This "vital personal
right," however, has been strictly limited to heterosexual relationships.' 0
The problem faced by the New Jersey court was deciding on a standard
to determine sex.
Two tests previously employed as a means for legally determining
sex were considered and rejected by the court." The English view,
enunciated in Corbett v. Corbett,12 holds that biological sex at the time
of birth is, for purposes of marriage, the critical factor in ascertaining
the sex of an individual.' 3 In Corbett, which also involved the marriage
of a surgically reassigned transsexual, the court enumerated four charac-
teristics to be used in discovering a person's biological sex: "(i) Chroma-
somal factors, (ii) Gonadal factors (i.e. presence or absence of testes or
ovaries), (iii) Genital factors (including internal sex organs), [and]
325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1971), which involved marriages by transsexuals. See 140
N.J Super. at -, 355 A.2d at 209-10. B. v. B. involved a transsexual who was surgi-
cally reassigned as a male. The New York court found that the surgery was unsuccess-
ful, since the transsexual had not received any male organs and was therefore incapable
of sexual performance as a male. 78 Misc. 2d at -, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 717. This mar-
riage could arguably have been annulled on the basis of impotence since plaintiff wife
apparently lacked knowledge of defendant's condition at the time she consented to the
marriage. See 78 Misc. 2d at -, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 713-14. See also note 18 infra.
Finding no marriage in Anonymous v. Anonymous, the New York court noted that
the parties had never lived together nor engaged in sexual intercourse. 67 Misc. 2d at
-, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 500. It further appeared that sex reassignment surgery did not
take place until after the "marriage." See id. Unlike the New York cases, the male-
to-female reassignment surgery in M.T. produced a sterile female, capable of engaging
in sexual intercourse in that role. See 140 N.J. Super. at -, 355 A.2d at 206. Further-
more, the reassignment occurred before the marriage and with defendant's knowledge.
Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 205.
8. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
9. Id. at 12 (citations omitted). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923).
10. See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson,
291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); B.
v. B., 78 Misc. 2d 112, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Anonymous v. Anonymous,
67 Misc. 2d 982, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1971); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App.
247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974). Most state statutes, as the above cases illustrate, do not
expressly require that the partners of a proposed union be of the opposite sex. Okla-
homa, apparently in the minority, provides by statute that a marriage can only be en-
tered into by persons of the opposite sex. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 3 (Supp. 1976).
11. See 140 N.J. Super. at -, 355 A.2d at 208-10.
12. [1970] 2 All E.R. 33 (P., P. Div'l Ct.).
13. Id. at 48-49.
8
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(iv) Psychological factors."14  When the first three factors concur, the
sex of the individual is established under this test, notwithstanding the
intervention of medical alterations.' 5 Two New York birth certificate
cases' 6 offer an example of the second test. While also emphasizing a
physical conceptualization of a person's sex, it is narrower than the
Corbett standard in that the chromosomal characteristic of the human
physiological makeup is the only relevant indicator of sex.17
Both tests leave the postoperative transsexual in a state of limbo;
he is legally incapable of assuming a new sex role in marriage, although
he can only engage in sexual intercourse in that role.' 8 Furthermore,
14. Id. at 44. Some of the expert witnesses in Corbett also urged that hormonal
or secondary sexual characteristics be considered. Id.
15. Id. at 48. In Corbett, while the male-to-female sex reassignment took place
before the marriage, the facts were complicated since the petitioner husband was appar-
ently a transvestite and there was conflicting evidence as to whether the parties engaged
in sexual relations. See id. at 34-40.
16. The court noted two New York cases, Hartin v. Director of Bureau of Records,
75 Misc. 2d 229, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 1973) and Anonymous v. Weiner, 50
Misc. 2d 380, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1966), which upheld refusals to change the
sex designation on the birth certificates of two transsexuals who had undergone sex
reassignment surgery. See 140 N.J. Super. at -, 355 A.2d at 210.
17. The Board of Health of the City of New York, when confronted with the prob-
lem, sought assistance in formulating policy from the New York Academy of Medicine.
A committee from the Academy concluded that
1. male-to-female transsexuals are still chromosomally males while osten-
sibly females;
2. it is questionable whether laws and records such as the birth certificate
should be changed and thereby used as a means to help psychologically ill per-
sons in their social adaptation.
T . .The desire of concealment of a change of sex by the transsexual is
outweighed by the public interest for protection against fraud.
Anonymous v. Weiner, 50 Misc. 2d 380, -, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319, 322 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
See also Hartin v. Director of Bureau of Records, 75 Misc. 2d 229, -, 347 N.Y.S.2d
515, 517 (Sup. Ct. 1973). In reliance on these conclusions, inter alia, the Board of
Health voted in 1965 not to allow a reassigned transsexual to change the sex designation
on the birth certificate. Anonymous v. Weiner, 50 Misc. 2d at -, 270 N.Y.S.2d at
322; Hartin v. Director of Bureau of Records, 75 Misc. 2d at -, 347 N.Y.S.2d at
518.
In opposition to the approach taken by New York City, some states have statutorily
authorized the change of sex on a transsexual's birth certificate after reassignment sur-
gery has taken place. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. § 36-326(A)(4), (B) (Supp. 1976);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, § 73-17(1)(d), (2)(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:61 (Supp. 1977). See generally, Holloway, Transsexuals-Their
Legal Sex, 40 U. COLO. L. REv. 282 (1968); Comment, The Law and Transsexualism:
A Faltering Response to A Conceptual Dilemma, 7 CONN. L. REV. 288 (1975) [herein-
after cited as The Law and Transsexualism].
18. See notes 12-17 supra and accompanying text. In the reassigned sex, the male-
to-female transsexual, while sterile, is still capable of engaging in sexual intercourse.
Comment, Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery and the Law, 56 CORNELL L. REV.
963, 970 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Sex Reassignment], citing W. MASTERS & V. JOHN-
SON, HUMAN SExUAL RESPONSE 101-10 (1966); Comment, Transsexuals in Limbo: The
9
Hayes: Criminal Procedure--Admission of Testimony Obtained in Violation
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013
19761 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
both tests neglect the medical and psychological realities involved in
classifying the transsexual. While the psychological self concept and
the various biological sex features are consistent in the normal person,
divergence of these factors are associated with the transsexual.' 9 The
medical profession, in recognition of the difficulties sometimes encoun-
tered in sex classification, relies on several factors to discern sex. These
include chromosomal makeup; gonadal structure; hormonal, internal,
and external morphological structure; assignment at birth and psycho-
sexual aspects.20
It should be noted, however, that a mechanical application of the
preceding factors is as inadequate in determining the sex of an individual
as the legal tests which have been applied. To illustrate, reliance on a
simple majority of agreeing factors incorrectly assumes that each aspect
of human sexuality is of equal significance. 2' Furthermore each factor,
considered alone, does not solve the problems presented by persons with
sexual abnormalities.22
In view of the difficulties in the use of previous legal and medical
Search For a Legal Definition of Sex, 31 MD. L. REV. 236, 240 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Transsexuals in Limbo]. Contra, Corbett v. Corbett, [1970] 2 All E.R. 33, 49
(P., P. Div'l Ct.). Since sterility per se is generally not a basis for annulment, see,
e.g., T. v. M., 100 N.J. Super. 530, 242 A.2d 670 (1968); Lapides v. Lapides, 254
N.Y. 73, 171 N.E. 911 (1930); H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES § 2.12 (1968), the marriage of a reassigned male-to-female trans-
sexual would be valid if the "new" sex was given legal recognition. However, since
the two tests noted above would deny recognition of the sex harmonization of the trans-
sexual, not only would the marriage be condemned on the basis that the parties were
of the same sex, see note 10 supra, but possibly could be held invalid on the basis
of impotence.
The female-to-male transsexual may pose a different problem. Only limited success
has been achieved with the construction of male organs; recipients have been unable
to engage in normal sexual relations. Sex Reassignment, supra at 970 n.39; The Law
and Transsexualism, supra note 17, at 293. This inability may lead to annulment on
the basis of impotence even if legal recognition is given to the reassigned sex. Thus,
for the female-to-male transsexual who is impotent as well as sterile, M.T. v. J.T. can
only provide a foundation for recognition of a new sexual identity; it may not protect
his marriage from attack.
19. See notes 2, 17 supra.
20. Sex Reassignment, supra note 18, at 965, citing Moore, Recent Developments
Concerning the Criteria of Sex and Possible Legal Implications, 31 MAN. B. NEws 104,
104-10 (1959); The Law and Transsexualism, supra note 17, at 290-91, citing Money,
The Sex Chromatin and Psychosexual Differentiation, in Trig SEX CHROMATIN 434-
35 (K. Moore ed. 1966).
21. Sex Reassignment, supra note 18, at 966.
22. Id. at 966-69. See Bowman & Engle, Sex Offenses: The Medical and Legal
Implications of Sex Variations, 25 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 292 (1960). In M.T. v.
J.T., it should be emphasized, the court focused on the converging of the psychological
and medically altered physical aspects of sexual identity rather than concentrating on
one to the exclusion of the other. See N.J. Super. at -, 355 A.2d at 209.
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standards developed to measure and define human sexuality, M.T. v.
J.T. takes an innovative, realistic, and humane approach to the sexual
identity of transsexuals. While the court recognizes that an anatomical
or physical test of sex is significant, and at times indispensable,23 it also
acknowledges that for purposes of marriage "sex in its biological sense
should [not] be the exclusive standard. 24  Rather, human sexuality
should be determined by the physical, psychological, and emotional
outlook of the individual." While the medically reassigned transsexual
is sterile, she is functionally a member of her "new" sex, possessing the
secondary characteristics of that sex. 26 Her anatomy conforms to her
psychological self image and only by medical examination can the
original anatomical sex be determined.
M.T. v. J.T. recognizes the dilemma of the preoperative transsex-
ual, whose anatomical and emotional characteristics are at odds, and
sanctions the medical attempt to, if not cure the problem, at least
provide a treatment. The New Jersey court's approach provides
financial protection to the postoperative transsexual who marries, as
well as furthering a sense of self satisfaction and well being. 8 While
the question of sexual identity and marriage may be charged with
emotion, there is no overriding societal interest which should operate to
deny recognition of the harmonization of the transsexual's anatomical
and psychological aspects of sexuality. As the court observed:
If . .. sex reassignment surgery is successful and the post-
operative transsexual is, by virtue of medical treatment, there-
by possessed of the full capacity to function sexually as a male
or female, as the case may be, we perceive no legal barrier,
cognizable social taboo, or reason grounded in public policy
to prevent that person's identification at least for purposes of
marriage to the sex finally indicated ...
... [S]uch an individual would have the capacity to
enter into a valid marriage relationship with a person of the
23. 140 N.J. Super. at -, 355 A.2d at 208.
24. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 209.
25. Id.
26. Sex Reassignment, supra note 18, at 970.
27. Id.
28. While the well-being of transsexuals is not the primary concern of the courts,
it was a beneficial by-product of the M.T. v. J.T. decision. See Transsexuals in Linbo,
supra note 18, at 239, citing Randell, Preoperative and Postoperative Status of Male
and Female Transsexuals, in TIRANssEXUALISM AND SEX REASSIGNMENT 379 (R. Green
& J. Money eds. 1969). Randell notes that postoperative transsexuals generally improve
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opposite sex. . . . In so ruling we do no more than give
legal effect to a fait accompli, based upon medical judgment
and action which are irreversible. 9
Rodney A. Hayes
29. 140 N.J. Super. at -, 355 A.2d at 210-11. The court only identified the poten-
tial for fraud, noted in the birth certificate cases, note 17 supra, as a possible societal
interest. See id. at -, 355 A.2d at 210. The court answered that interest by repeating
the trial court's observation: "The transsexual is not committing a fraud upon the pub-
lic. In actuality she is doing her utmost to remove any false facade." Id. See also
In re Anonymous, 57 Misc. 2d 813, -, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834, 838 (Civ. Ct. 1968).
However, other interests of the state in the institution of marriage can be identified.
In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), marriage, as a "basic civil right," was
linked to the propagation of society. See id. at 541. Since the surgically reassigned
male-to-female transsexual is sterile, see note 18 supra, an argument could be made
that her right of marriage is of less significance than that of the "normal" male-female
union, thereby providing a basis for different treatment. See Baker v. Nelson, 291
Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). The public
interest was also raised in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). There the
Supreme Court held that the Mormon institution of polygamy could be constitutionally
forbidden. Identifying the state interest, the Court declared:
Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is nevertheless, in
most civilized nations, a civil contract, and usually regulated by law. Upon
it society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social relations
and social obligations and duties, with which government is necessarily re-
quired to deal. In fact, according as monogamous or polygamous marriages
are allowed, do we find the principles on which the government of the people,
to a greater or less extent, rests. . . . [Plolygamy leads to the patriarchal
principle, and which, when applied to large communities, fetters the people in
stationary despotism, while that principle cannot long exist in connection with
monogamy.
Id. at 165-66. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) ("Marriage, as creating
the most important relation in life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization
of a people than any other institution, has always been subject to the control of the
E . . [state]"). Recoguition of marriages of sterile reassigned transsexuals could pos-
sibly present the danger of creating a society incapable of perpetuating itself. While
that danger may seem remote, procreation is nonetheless an interest that the public
possesses in the institution of marriage. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1941).
The existence of the state's interest in marriage does not, however, demand a differ-
ent result in the case. First of all, it has been noted that sterility alone does not affect
the validity of a "normal" male-female marriage. See note 18 supra. Additionally,
it would appear that the right of marriage has been separated from procreation. See
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). Finally, an argument can be made that the decision to harmonize the attributes
of sexual identity, like other decisions affecting a person's bodily autonomy, is within
the protection of privacy; therefore, the state's interest must be more compelling than
the possibility of a barren society before the marriage of a transsexual can be invali-
dated. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also Transsexuals in
Limbo, supra note 18, at 244-47.
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 12 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol12/iss2/11
13
Hayes: Criminal Procedure--Admission of Testimony Obtained in Violation
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013
